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An Unholy Alliance:1 The Ex Parte
Relationship Between the Judge
and the Prosecutor
"Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious
or political; peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entan-
gling alliances with none."2
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1. The term "unholy alliance" appears to have originated as the opposite of the Holy
Alliance, which referred to the agreement between the emperor of Russia and
Austria and the king of Prussia which was based on the idea that the signers
would agree to conduct affairs of state according to the principals of Christian
morality. See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIoNARY 1250 (1993). The
term has been used throughout legal scholarship to refer to relationships within
the law that are not based on the furtherance of justice, but on other principals
which are damaging to the system. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and
Politics: a Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73
CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1067 & n.110 (1985) (bemoaning the lack of power of citizens
against the unholy alliance of big spending, special interests and election
victory); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the
Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDozo L. Rav. 357, 397 (1994) (noting the unholy alliance between Congress
and the Courts in the area of religious issues); John Burritt McArthur, Cost
Responsibility or Regulatory Indulgence for Electricity's Stranded Costs?, 47 Am.
U. L. REv. 775, 921 (1998)(discussing the alliance between utility executives and
environmentalists); Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BRooK. L. REv. 1, 65 (1996)(calling the relationship between
gangs, corrupt police, and Tammany Hall an unholy alliance). The term was
applied to the judge and prosecutor in Rodney Thaxton & Lida Rodriguez-Taseff,
Professionalism and Life in the Trenches: The Case of the Public Defender, 8 ST.
THoMAs L. REv. 185, 191 (1995).
2. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in PAnE AND JEFFERSON ON LIBERTY
139, 142 (Lloyd S. Kramer ed., 1988).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson suggested that
the avoidance of entangling alliances was necessary for the success of
the young nation.3 For the criminal prosecutor and the trial judge,
avoiding an entangling alliance is essential to the functioning of the
adversary system. The adversary system4 is based on the "philosophy
that insists on keeping the function of the advocate, on the one hand,
3. See id.
4. "The term [adversary system] has no fixed and precise meaning... [yet] it is a
useful term for identifying a distinctive set of features and style of decision mak-
ing that is most fully developed in Anglo-American legal systems...." Nancy
Amoury Combs, Comment, Understanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous Citi-
zen, the Managed Subject and The Role of the Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. REV. 663, 683
n.160 (1994)(omissions and alterations in original)(quoting Malcolm Feeley, The
Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDIcIAL SYSTEM, 753,
753 (Robert J. Janosik ed., 1987)). The adversary system is a dispute resolution
method characterized by resolving issues based on information provided by the
parties in conflict. See STEPHAN LA DSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCaw-
TION AND DEFENSE 1 (1984).
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from that of the judge on the other hand."5 The American justice sys-
tem, which utilizes the adversary system, is premised on the assump-
tion that truth will emerge from two advocates presenting their
version of the facts in a structured format to a neutral and detached
decision-maker.6 The advocates in the adversary system bear the sole
responsibility for the presentation of the facts. The decision-maker
must sit as a passive participant to the proceeding and decide the
truth based on the facts presented in court. The decision-maker has
no role in the discovery, investigation, or presentation of the case. The
adversary system is anchored on the principles that if the decision-
maker becomes actively involved in the presentation of the facts, she7
risks becoming biased toward one version or the other.8 Additionally,
the presence of a passive decision-maker appears more neutral than a
judge,9 who is actively involved in the questioning and presentation.iO
Although the role of the prosecutor in the adversary system resem-
bles in many respects that of a zealous advocate,1i the nature of the
prosecutor's practice requires constant contact and cooperation with
the trial judge. This constant contact causes the relationship to take
on characteristics that are different from the relationship between the
judge and other lawyers. The creation of this interdependent relation-
ship may produce a "team spirit" between the court and prosecutor,
which is counter to the fundamental philosophy of the adversary
system.' 2
5. LANDSAN, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALxs ON AMERICAN LAw 34-35 (Harold Berman ed. 1961).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 33-98.
7. For purposes of simplicity the judge throughout this paper will be referred to
with a female pronoun and the prosecutor and all other attorneys will be referred
to using the male pronoun.
8. See LANsmAN, supra note 4, at 3.
9. Although in most criminal cases the final judgment will be based on the findings
of a lay jury, this article discusses the role of the judge as the decision-maker.
For an interesting discussion of the merging of the role of the jury and the judge
in the area of legal decision-making see Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the
Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. OF
CRni. L. & CRIUNOLOGY 111 (1998).
10. See LAN sMAN, supra note 4, at 3.
11. Although the prosecutor is a zealous advocate, the Rules of Professional Conduct
also require the prosecutor to act as a minister of justice. See MODEL RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CorDucT Rule 3.8 in THomAs & RONALD ROTUNDA, 2000 SELECTED
STANDRDs ON PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmLTY 74 (2000) [hereinafter STANrARDS];
Roberta K Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Code to Include
the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 930-939
(1996)(see authority cited therein)[hereinafter Flowers, Code of Their Own];
Roberta K. Flowers, What you See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REv. 699, 728-66 (1998)(discuss-
ing the interplay between the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and zealous
advocacy)[hereinafter Flowers, What You See].
12. See infra text accompanying notes 138-166.
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One of the by-products of the cooperative relationship between a
prosecutor and trial judge is the occurrence of impermissible ex parte
communications.' 3 Improper ex parte communications occur when
one side of a controversy is able to discuss or influence the decision-
maker's opinion and thereby receive a tactical or substantive advan-
tage. Because ex parte communications allow the judge to make deci-
sions before hearing both sides of the case, and may require her to
undertake the job of an advocate, improper discussions obstruct the
proper functioning of the adversary system.' 4
This Article seeks to explain the relationship between the prosecu-
tor and the trial judge and how that relationship must be closely
monitored to avoid impeding the successful application of the adver-
sary process. Part I explains the underlying premises of the adversary
system.' 5 Part II describes the nature of the relationship between the
prosecutor and the trial judge and how that relationship may impact
the adversary process.i6 Part III discusses improper ex parte commu-
nications as the antithesis of the adversary system.' 7 Finally, Part IV
suggests safeguards that can help avoid the creation of the "team ap-
proach" to prosecution.' 8
II. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND THE NECESSITY OF A
NEUTRAL INDEPENDENT COURT
A. History of the Adversary System
The adversary system is as integral a part of our American heri-
tage as capitalism and sporting competitions.' 9 Although the Consti-
tution does not mention the existence or creation of the adversary
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFEssIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.5 in STANDARDS, supra note
11, at 68.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 266-289.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 19-115.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 116-166.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 167-289.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 290-307.
19. See Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD
LAWYER 172, 173-74 (David Luban ed., 1983)(noting that the adversary system is
reflective of our society's belief that open and unrestrained competition maxi-
mizes the collective good); Johnannes F. Nijboer, The American Adversarial Sys-
tem in Criminal Cases: Between Ideology and Reality, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CO1,OP.
L. 79, 95 (1997)(comparing the adversarial system to the "free economic market
and the liberal political philosophy" that exists in the United States). The anal-
ogy to sporting events was first made by Roscoe Pound in 1906. See FRaNKLIN D.
STRIER & EDITH GREENE, THE ADVERSARY SYsTEM: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
3 (1990)[hereinafter STRIER & GREENE]; see also Edwin Meese I, Promoting
Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271 (1987)(lamenting exclusionary
rules that create a criminal justice system that resembles a sporting event).
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process, 20 the adversary system has been the primary method of dis-
pute resolution in America since the beginning of the republic.21 The
courts have routinely mentioned the need for adherence to an adver-
sary process. 22 One commentator noted that the adversary process is
"so basic that the Constitution does not even mention it."23
The adversary method of dispute resolution traces its origin to
three methods of trial present in medieval Europe. 24 These methods
were trial by battle, trial by ordeal, and wager of law.25 Trial by bat-
tle, which was brought to England by William the Conqueror, required
the accused to fight with the accuser.26 The underlying belief was
that "N[heaven would give the victory to him who was in the right."27
Battle by ordeal resembled the trial by battle in that it invoked heav-
enly judgment.28 In the battle by ordeal, the litigant, after taking an
oath that his cause was just, would subject himself to physical torture
that might include carrying a hot bar, placing his arm in boiling
water, or being totally immersed in water.2 9 If the litigant survived
the ordeal then judgment was entered in his favor. Finally, wager of
law was a method of establishing the justness of the litigant's cause by
measuring his standing in the community. The litigant would produce
a certain number of other people from the community who would join
him in his oath as to the justness of his cause. Depending on how
many people he could get to join him, his cause would be deemed
proven.30
20. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that the adversary system has been
"constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975).
21. See LAsD sAN, supra note 4, at 1.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring)(noting that the requirement that issues not argued will not be decided by
the court is an important distinction between the adversary system and the in-
quisitory system); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984)(recogniz-
ing that the adversary system gives meaning to the Sixth Amendment).
23. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note
19, at 98 (quoting Theodore I. Koskoff, Introduction to THE AiERcIN LAWYER'S
CODE OF CONDUCT ii, ii (Public Discussion Draft 1980))thereinafter Luban, Ex-
cuse]; see In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 475 (D.C. 1996)(recognizing that the adver-
sarial system principles "are deeply embedded in the [wrap] and wool of our
law").
24. See LAND S , supra note 4, at 8.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 3; JOSEPH F. LAWLEss, JR., PROSECUTOIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCE-
DUnn, FonMs 14 n.47 (2d ed. 1999).
27. LAWLESs, supra note 26, at 8 n.18; see Flowers, Code of Their Own, supra note 11
at 923.
28. See ANNE STRUCK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 25-26 (Barricade Books 1996) (1977)(noting
that ordeals resembled trial by battles in that they both relied on divine interven-
tion for settlement of disputes).
29. See LANnsmN, supra note 4, at 9.
30. See id. at 8-9.
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Although each of these methods used a limited amount of evidence,
each resembled the present adversary system in two important ways.
Each of these methods required active participation by the advocates
or parties and a limited participation by the judge.S1 The judge's par-
ticipation in these early forms of trial was limited to administering the
oath to the litigants and then deciding which method of trial would be
utilized in the case. Much like today's jurist, his medieval counterpart
did not take part in the actual combat, but merely set the ground rules
for the contest and then declared the judgment.3 2
B. Principals of the Adversary System
The adversary system 33 of today is premised on three basic princi-
ples. First, the system requires a dispute between two or more par-
ties, who will themselves or through zealous advocates present their
view of the dispute. Second, the facts will be presented in a structured
format. Finally, the system requires that a neutral and passive deci-
sion-maker render the ultimate judgment.
1. Contentious Presentation of the Evidence
The basic premise of the system is that at least two individuals
have a factual dispute upon which they cannot agree.34 Therefore,
31. See Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary Sys-
tem, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 719 (1983).
32. See id. at 718-19 (noting that the court's role was limited to determining the form
of the trial and deciding which party would bear the burden of proof); see also
STRIER & GREENE, supra note 19, at 41.
33. Several justifications have been asserted for the adversary system. The system
relies in part on the belief that truth can be found through a method of legal
combat. See Luban, Excuse, supra note 23, at 95 (noting that some argue that
"facts are best discovered by a battle between two conflicting points of view");
Meese, supra note 19, at 271 (asserting that truth is the basic mission of the
criminal justice system). Additional justifications for the system include the ra-
tional that the adversary process protects individual rights and dignity. See
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAwyRs' ETHics IN AN ADvERARY SYSTEM 8 (1975)(not-
ing the system "preserves the dignity of the individual"). Some justify this sys-
tem as being the "only effective means for combating [sic] this natural tendency
to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known."
FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE, AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 36
(1996)(quoting Fuller, supra note 5, at 43-44)[hereinafter STRIER, JUSTICE].
Others have assailed the adversary system as ineffective and a "relic of a primi-
tive way of seeing and thinking about the world." STRICK, supra note 28, at 21.
Justice Rehnquist stated, "I think we must be aware of the societal interests be-
ing sacrificed in pursuit of providing an adversary forum for the vindication of
claims of individual rights." STRIER & GREENE, supra note 19, at 1 (citation
omitted).
34. See STRIER, JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 13.
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they must turn to a third party for resolution.3 5 The assumption is
that each party believes its version of the facts to be correct, and are
therefore unable to resolve the issue. This premise requires individu-
als to "choose sides," to take a position for the adversary process to be
necessary. The entire process calls for the contentious presentation of
evidence from beginning to end.3 6 The rules of the process may call
for reciprocation, but never cooperation. 3 7 As Robert Kutak explained,
"a fundamental premise of the adversary system of jurisprudence is
that a competitive, rather than cooperative, presentation and analysis
of the facts underlying a dispute will produce a greater number of cor-
rect results."38
In believing in the rightness of its position, each party is ultimately
responsible for presenting his case. The parties in the adversary sys-
tem initiate and control the definition of the dispute.3 9 The advocate's
responsibility is to present its side, not an even-handed assessment of
the facts, thus leaving the opponent with the responsibility of present-
ing its version.4 0 Each party, either alone or through legal represen-
tation, seeks to "put its best foot forward."41 The adversary system
presupposes that each side bears the obligation not only to present
evidence supporting its case, but also to ferret out all evidence that
supports his case and contradicts the opponent's case. 42 As the court
recognized in United States v. Gomez-Gallardo,43 "[t]he adversarial
system breaks down when the defendant is prevented from defining
and presenting his own case. .. ."44
In most criminal cases, a lawyer represents the party. Interested
parties usually do not participate directly, except as witnesses. 4 5 In
35. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER,
supra note 19, at 150, 153.
36. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmICs 564 (1986); United States v.
Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1300 (9th Cir. 1977)(noting that the adversary process con-
tinues even into the sentencing phase of the criminal trial).
37. See Kutak, supra note 19, at 174.
38. Id.
39. See WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 564. In a criminal prosecution, the government
must initiate the dispute by the filing of a charging document. See id.
40. See JOSEPH KELNER & FRANcis E. McGOVERN, SUCCESSFUL LITIGATION TECH-
NIQUES: STUDENT EDITION § 8.01 at 8-1 (1981)(defining the work of the advocate
in the adversary system as presenting "the client's case in the most favorable
possible manner within the bounds of the law and the code of ethics").
41. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 153; see also In re Larsen, 616 A-2d 529, 597 (Pa.
1992)(stressing the importance of the advocate's role "to breathe life, meaning
and measure into the spirit and value of... constitutional guarantee[s] .... ")
42. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CaMn.
L. BULL. 126, 129-130 (1988).
43. 915 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1990).
44. Id. at 556.
45. See WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 564. One is reminded of the old saying, "An
attorney who represents himself has a fool for a client."
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putting forth his best case, the advocate will zealously advocate its
position. As Lord Brougham claimed in his defense of Queen Caroline
before the House of Lords in 1820:
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the dis-
charge of that office, but one person in the world, THAT CLIENT AND NONE
OTHER. To save that client by all expedient means - to protect that client at
all hazards and costs, to all others and amongst others to himself - is the
highest and most unquestioned of his duties .... 46
At its very core, the adversary system requires one-sided loyalty.47
The system, in essence, requires a sense of "equal competence." 48
Each advocate must be similarly qualified in skill and zeal. At the
center of this competitive model of dispute resolution is the assump-
tion that neither side is responsible for the competence of the other,49
and is not required to share in any way with the other side.50 In the
adversary process, the advocate is required to be partisan, the initia-
46. Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REv. 625,
628 & 628 n.17 (1979).
47. In discussing Lord Brougham's declaration, Judge Marvin Frankel lamented that
"Lord Brougham was wrong; we should be less willing to fight the world and...
more concerned to save our own souls. As ministers of justice, we should find
ourselves more positively concerned than we now are with the pursuit of truth."
Marvin E. Frankel, WASHINGTON POST, May 7, 1978, available in ELIZABETH
FROST-KNAPPMAN & DAVID S. SHRAGER, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER (revised ed.
1998); see also In re Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc., 868 P.2d 419, 437 (Haw.
1994)(Levinson, J., concurring)(citing Frankel's quote).
48. Professor Schwartz discussed the two postulates that underlie the adversarial
system: the Postulates of Equal Competence and Equal Adversariness. See
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 153-55; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 60
(1991)(discussing the ethical duty on prosecutors to achieve justice)[hereinafter
Zacharias, Justice]. According to Justice Marshall, under the traditional model of
adversary criminal process, "[t]he state and [the defendant] could meet... in
adversary trial, as equals - strength against strength, resource against resource,
argument against argument." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 694, n.2
(1985)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. See Kutak, supra note 19, at 174; United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)(indicating that the system contemplates the opportunity in trial to
challenge opposing counsel's misstatements).
50. In voicing his opposition to the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,
Justice Scalia observed that
[b]y placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damag-
ing to their clients - on their own initiative, and in a context where the
lines between what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed are
not clear but require the exercise of considerable judgment - the new
Rule would place intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to re-
present their clients and not to assist the opposing side.
STEPHEN GILLERs, REGULATION OF LAwYERS 371 (4th ed. 1995).
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tor and presenter of the evidence, and in control of his side of the
story.S1
2. A Structured Set of Rules of Presentation
Although many see the contest between advocates as "legal com-
bat,"52 the battle is fought under a strict set of rules. The adversary
system contemplates that the controversy will be decided in a forum
with a structured set of rules.5 3 The rules include rules of procedure,
evidence, and ethics.54
These rules have several purposes: facilitating the search for truth,
giving the reality and appearance of a level playing field, and control-
ling the advocates' behavior.55 Specifically, the rules of procedure con-
trol the pre-trial, trial and post-trial phases of the case.56 Their
purpose is to assure that the evidence will be presented during one
trial and therefore the decision-maker will decide the case based on
the confrontation of the two sides in one forum.57 Additionally, the
rules defining discovery, prohibiting frivolous lawsuits and claims,
and limiting delay tactics "mitigate adversarial excess."58 Finally, the
rules of procedure modify the adversary system's principles regarding
the parties' control of their information. 59
51. See Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1997); District of Columbia v. WICAL
Ltd. Partnership, 630 A.2d 174, 185 (D.C. 1992)(noting that courts rely on coun-
sel to "try their own case").
52. See James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel
Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 1, 65 (1988); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility
Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE
DAAm L. REV. 223 (1993)[hereinafter Zacharias, Codes]. Judge Frankel main-
tains that during trials the "pervasive air of combat" surrounds the Judge forcing
him into the role of "a combatant with a shifting but endless series of opponents."
MARTIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 47 (1980).
53. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 48, at 60; Nijboer, supra note 19, at 94 (noting
that the adversary system is sometimes used as a basis for explaining the need
for these rules).
54. See LNsANm, supra note 4, at 4-5.
55. See Meese, supra note 19, at 280 (suggesting that some of our rules are based on
our mistrust ofjuries); Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation
in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. Ray. 671, 673 (1997)(arguing that
procedural rules in an adversary system should be "designed to maximize the
likelihood of truthful results").
56. See LANDs AN, supra note 4, at 4-5.
57. See United States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(Garland, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Garland observed that our adversary system relies on the "opportu-
nity each side has to challenge the other's misstatements before a jury." Id. at
704.
58. David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Anitheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2064,2078
(1997)(indicating that the rules of procedure and ethics make the adversary sys-
tem bearable)[hereinafter Luban, Hero].
59. See Crystal, supra note 55, at 674-675.
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The rules of evidence attempt to control the kind of evidence sub-
mitted to the decision-maker.60 The rules promote the ascertainment
of truth,6 1 and proceedings that are fair and just.62 These rules "pro-
tect the integrity of the testimonial segment of adversary proceedings"
by prohibiting the use of unreliable, misleading, or highly emotional
evidence.63 The evidence rules contemplate that the parties will con-
trol what evidence they present.64 The rules controlling the examina-
tion of witnesses, presentation of evidence, and objections all give the
"initiative to the parties."65
Judge Frankel noted that the judge's ability to maintain the court-
room is limited by the procedural rules which give the lawyers the
functions of "initiating, organizing, and conducting" the presentation
of the evidence.66 In addition to controlling the admissibility of evi-
dence, the rules of evidence also control the judge's discretion.67 The
rules of evidence define the court's discretion in determining what evi-
dence will reach the trier of fact.68
Finally, the rules of ethics attempt to keep the zealousness of the
advocates in check.69 These rules are necessary because the lawyer is
a "gladiator" who uses weapons in the courtroom not "crusading after
truth but seeking to win."7 0 The Rules of Professional Conduct control
60. See LANDMAN, supra note 4, at 5.
61. But see Meese, supra note 19, at 277 (asserting that many constitutionally cre-
ated exclusionary rules are truth-defeating).
62. See FED. R. EVID. 102, which states, "[tlhese rules shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
63. LANDSMAN, supra note 4, at 5.
64. See Nijboer, supra note 19, at 94.
65. Id. (noting that the party who wishes to present certain evidence has the burden
of laying the proper foundation under the rules).
66. FAuL, supra note 52, at 39.
67. See LANDSMAN, supra note 4, at 5; Vanemmerik v. Ground Round Inc., No.
Civ.A.97-5923, 1998 WL 474106, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1998)(recognizing that
FED. R. EvID. 611(a) assures that the judge is ultimately responsible for the effec-
tive working of the adversary system"); Cox v. State, 843 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Tex.
1992)(acknowledging that the trial judge is the best situated to decide what evi-
dence is relevant).
68. See Gable v. Kroger Co., which found that detailed rules governing the admissi-
bility of evidence are neither "desirable nor feasible." 410 S.E.2d 701, 703 (W. Va.
1991)(quoting FED. R. EVID. 611(a) advisory committee's note). Rather, 'The ulti-
mate responsibility for the effective working of the adversary system rests with
the judge. The rule sets forth the objectives which he should seek to attain." Id.
(quoting FED. R. EviD. 611(a) advisory committee's note).
69. See LANDsMAN, supra note 4, at 5; Luban, Hero, supra note 58, at 2078 (conceding
that "[gliven enough procedural tinkering to mitigate adversarial excess, adver-
sarial litigation does a creditable job of ensuring that plausible arguments are
not overlooked.").
70. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: an Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1039 (1975); Crystal, supra note 55, at 711-12.
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the advocate's "natural tendencies" to seek to win at all costs and by
all means.71 Rules prohibiting misleading or harassing the opponent
or third parties 72 attempt to limit the advocate to behavior that as-
sures the "integrity of the system."73 On the other hand, the rules
define the role of the advocates to represent their clients zealously.74
The rules attempt to define and maintain the role of the professional
advocate in order to further the ends of the adversary system.75
3. An Impartial Tribunal Will Decide the Outcome
Finally, the adversary process assumes that both sides will present
their case to a neutral, passive tribunal.76 One author calls this as-
sumption the adversary system's "first and most essential element."77
The principle is that the fact-finder, whether judge or jury, is neu-
tral.78 The fact-finder begins the process without demonstrable bias
or knowledge of the facts.79 Although the judge may have some
71. LANDsiAN, supra note 4, at 5.
72. See generally GILLERS, supra note 50 (providing descriptions of the ABA Model
Rules).
73. LANDSAAN, supra note 4, at 5. But see FREEDMAN, supra note 33, at 15 (criticizing
Chief Justice Burger's attacks on "adrenalin[sic]-fueled" lawyers, as not being ac-
curate). Freedman asserts that the real danger is not the over-zealous lawyers,
but the attempts to restrict the advocacy of lawyers in search of civility.
74. See LANDsIAN, supra note 4, at 5; MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.3
(cmt.)("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
75. See Virgin Islands Housing Authority v. David, 823 F.2d 764, 767 n.7 (3d Cir.
1987)("Zealous advocacy should not mean unbounded advocacy. Counsel's role
must to some extent be defined to reflect the basic purpose of the adversary sys-
tem as a means of promoting the discovery of truth.... ." (quoting Meese, supra
note 19, at 280-81)).
76. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 48, at 85; Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777,
782 (D.C. App. 1990)(noting that the court should act as an "impartial arbiter.").
77. STmCi, supra note 28, at 145.
78. See WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 566. In most American criminal cases, the im-
partial tribunal is made up of lay jurors. See JOSEPH D. GANo, CONFESSIONS,
Tit=r AND THE LAW 6 (1993).
79. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 295 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. 1972)(Roberts, J. concur-
ring)(emphasizing prosecutor's duty to disclose juror's relationship to the victim);
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3(E)(1)(a) (1999)(requiring judge to
recuse himself when he has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding."); STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 642. But see VAE=
P. HANS & NEIL Vmi1AR, JUDGING THE JURY 23-24 (1986)(stating that early jurors
were required to know either the parties or the facts to qualify for jury service).
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knowledge of a case from pretrial motions,80 any independent knowl-
edge of the facts would usually disqualify her.8X
In order to insure impartiality, the tribunal has no responsibility
to investigate or present any evidence.8 2 "Under our system of laws, a
judge is not an investigator; the investigative function belongs to the
parties and their agents."8 3 The judge takes on the role of umpire
rather than participant.8 4 The parties explore the issues.8 5 The fact-
finder takes no initiative to define the issues in the case,8 6 to elicit any
evidence8 7 or to investigate any uncharted avenues of defense.8 8 The
80. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1002 (5th Cir. 1981)(holding potential
bias insufficient to warrant recusal when judge obtained information from non-
prosecuting government attorneys); United States v. Jackson, 430 F.2d 1113,
1115 (9th Cir. 1970)(noting that the fact that the trial judge issued an order re-
voking appellants' bail bonds not a "disqualifying fact" under circumstances
where judge knew of alleged threats to witnesses).
81. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDuCT Canon 2(B) (1990)(prohibiting judges
from allowing relationships to influence judicial conduct); STANDARDs, supra note
11, at 635; see generally Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)(finding that a judge
with a financial interest in the case cannot render a fair and impartial decision).
82. See Ryan v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724, 733 (Cal. 1986).
83. In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 475 (D.C. App. 1996); see also Ryan, 754 P.2d at 773
(finding the judge acted improperly in conducting his own investigation into a hit-
and-run accident and then calling to a witness during a criminal defendant's case
to rebut the defendant's claims); Wenger v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 630
P.2d 954, 962-63 (Cal. 1981)(noting that the court improperly conducted an inves-
tigation into the accuracy of statements in the pleadings); Price Bros. Co. v. Phil-
adelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1980)(holding that the court
acted improperly in sending his law clerk to investigate the scene of the
litigation).
84. See STRmcK, supra note 28, at 142 (quoting one judge as lamenting that "the State
has been relegated largely to the function of furnishing the stadium and the
referees; of booking, staging and deciding these civilized fights. .. ." The author
denounces the system as allowing the court's decision to "anoint not truth but
merely the winner of the brawl."); Wilson v. PNS Stores, Inc., 725 So. 2d 66, 73
(La. Ct. App. 1998); Dixon v. Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 638 So. 2d 306, 316 (La.
Ct. App. 1994). But cf. Luban, Hero, supra note 58 (discussing the role of the
situational judge as mediator and prime mover in settlement of complex class
actions).
85. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 36.
86. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966)("In our adversary system,
it is enough for judges to judge. The determination of what may be useful to the
defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate."); Common-
wealth v. Edwards, 637 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa. 1993).
87. See Plooster v. Pierce Packing Co., 846 P.2d 976, 980 (Mont. 1993)(Trieweiler, J.,
dissenting)(criticizing the majority opinion for allowing the trier of fact to base
his decision on his own experiences rather than the evidence before him. This
process is "the antithesis of our adversary system."); LaChappelle v. Moran, 699
F.2d 560, 566 (1st Cir. 1983)("Adversarial conduct by the trial judge is to be
frowned upon, most particularly in a criminal trial.")
88. See Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)("The
theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be in-
duced only by evidence and argument in open court.. . ."); United States v.
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Eleventh Circuit has defined the judge's role as the "informational
gatekeeper and legal adviser."8 9 The judge as fact-finder is required
to make her decision solely on the evidence presented by the parties.90
As part of the court's role of a passive and neutral decision-maker,
the court must maintain its independence. The independence of thejudiciary is the cornerstone of the American justice system.91 Inde-
pendence requires the court to have no interest in the outcome of the
case.92 The judge's only interest in an adversary system must be to
give each litigant the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge."93 A
vested interest in the case causes the court's impartiality to be
questioned.94
The independence of the judiciary also includes independence from
influences outside the courtroom. 95 Although judges are not immune
from criticism, they must decide cases irrespective of the popular
will.96 Judges may at times decide cases that are "countermajori-
Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994)(observing that in dealing with issues
not presented by the parties the court must be "mum"); Marshall v. Gates, 812 F.
Supp. 1050, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 1993)(quoting Tatalovich v. City of Superior, 904
F.2d 1135, 1139 (7th Cir. 1990)("if opposing lawyers sit on their haunches...judges may let the adversary system take its course.")).
89. Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398, 410 (11th Cir. 1994).
90. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 48, at 61; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3(B)(commentary at 10)("A Judge must not independently investigate
facts in a case and must consider only the evidence presented."); STAN!DARDS,
supra note 11, at 639.
91. See Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and
Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HoFsTRA L. REv. 703, 708 (1997)(quoting from a
prosecutor who said that "itihe independence of the judiciary is obviously one of
the fundamental cornerstones of our government and democracy. It is indeed
that independence that both the Government and defendants rely upon in every
case for a fair and just decision on the merits." Louis H. Pollack, Criticizing
Judges, 79 JuDiCATuRE 299, 301 (1996)).
92. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)(finding that due process is violated when
the court has a financial interest in whether the defendant is convicted); Luban,
Hero, supra note 58, at 2080 (discussing the dangers to impartiality when the
judge becomes invested in the settlement of a case).
93. State ex rel Davis v. Parks, 194 So. 2d 613, 615 (Fla. 1939).
94. See Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1992)(stating that a court's imparti-
ality must be beyond question). But see In re Starcher, 457 S.E.2d 147, 152 (W.
Va. 1995)(Neely, C.J., dissenting)(noting that "all of the qualities that make a
person a great judge-enthusiasm, creativity, boundless energy, concern, good
training, and surpassing intelligence-may cause a judge occasionally to become
too involved in the case").
95. Institutional independence, which is provided in the constitutional creation of
three branches of government, is beyond the scope of this paper but is assumed to
be present in an adversary system. See generally Martin H. Redish, Federal Ju-
dicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REv.
697 (1995); LANDsMAN, supra note 4.
96. See Kaye, supra note 91, at 711; see generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and
the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. RIv. 760 (1990).
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tarian."9 7 The adversary system, however, is premised on the as-
sumption that the judge will consider only the evidence presented to
him within the courtroom.
C. Adversary System Distinguished From the Inquisitory
System
The adversary system can be compared to its European counter-
part, the inquisitorial system, which is based on civil law reflecting
the Roman law.98 The main characteristic that distinguishes the two
systems is that, in the adversary system, the function of the judge and
advocate are always kept completely separate.9 9 In the inquisitorial
system, the court has a more active role and, therefore, the advocate's
role is diminished.100 The inquisitory judge is the state's representa-
tive in the inquest.101 She therefore investigates the case, 102 calls
witnesses, and defines the scope of the inquiry.103 The attorney's role
in the inquisitorial system is primarily limited to proposing additional
questions for the judge. 104
Additionally, the rules of procedure are much less formal, strict, or
technical in the European system. 0 5 Very few exclusionary rules ex-
ist in the inquisitorial system because of the lack of concern about the
ability of the lay jury to properly use the evidence.10 6 In the civil law
trial the lay jurors deliberate with the judge, who can instruct them
during deliberations about the proper use of the evidence.107
The role of judge and advocate in the inquisitorial system is
merged.10 8 The judge is profoundly involved in the prosecution of the
97. See generally Kaye, supra note 91.
98. See generally In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470 (D.C. App. 1996).
99. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992)(Scalia, J., concurring); Ball
v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Ours is an adversarial system
and the judge cannot play lawyer for one or for that matter both sides of a case
before him.. . ."); Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1992)(noting
that American trial judges do not have the time to play "the proactive role" of the
judge in the inquisitorial system).
100. See Combs, supra note 4, at 663, 683; STRIER, JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 210.
101. See STRUER, JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 210; Luban, Excuse, supra note 23, at 94.
102. See Stephen Lubet, Ex parte Communications: An Issue in Judicial Conduct, 74
JUDICATURE 96, 101 (1990)(noting the difference between the European system,
in which the judge has primary responsibility for the development of the facts,
and the American system where it is improper for the court to undertake an ex
parte investigation).
103. See STmR, JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 210.
104. See id.; Luban, Excuse, supra note 23, at 95 (noting that it would be very unusual
for the lawyer to ask more than one or two questions because such conduct might
imply that the court had not done a very good job of asking questions).
105. See Luban, Excuse, supra note 23, at 95.
106. See Meese, supra note 19; Luban, Excuse, supra note 23, at 95.
107. See Luban, Excuse, supra note 23, at 95.
108. See Luban, Excuse, supra note 23, at 94.
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case. For example, in the German criminal trial the judge can amend
the charge either by increasing or diminishing it.109 On the contrary,
in the adversary system, the prosecution of the case is left to the pros-
ecuting attorney.'1 0 The prosecuting attorney has almost total discre-
tion in directing the investigation,3l1 in fashioning the appropriate
charges,"Z2 and deciding the available plea offers.1 3 The job of prose-
cutor and court are totally separated.114 The court should not be "on
the team with the police to catch criminals."115
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JUDGE
AND PROSECUTOR
A. An Intimate Relationship
Although the judge and prosecutor are active participants in the
adversary system, their relationship often develops into a more inter-
dependent and cooperative relationship than would be enjoyed by the
109. See id.
110. See State v. Ramano, 662 P.2d 406 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)(finding judge's conduct
improper where he consulted friends in the jewelry business to verify the defen-
dant's statements about his business).
111. See generally United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 1986) super-
seded by 855 F.2d 621 (1988)(reversing the district court's dismissal of the indict-
ment); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393
(1992)(discussing the trend for prosecutors to become increasingly involved in in-
vestigations); Flowers, Code of Their Own, supra note 11 (discussing the role of
the prosecutor in the investigation of criminal cases).
112. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965)(holding that the court
cannot interfere with a prosecutor's decisions to bring charges); see also
Gershman, supra note 111, at 409 (arguing that the most extreme example of the
prosecutor's discretion is in the area of charging decisions in capital cases); see
generally Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859 (1985)(recognizing the long
standing rule that prosecutor's have broad discretion in charging decisions);
Charles J. Yeager & Lee Hargrave, The Power of the Attorney General to
Supercede a District Attorney: Substance Procedure & Ethics, 51 LA. L. REv. 733(1991); Flowers, What You See, supra note 11.
113. See United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1981)(agreeing to sen-
tence concessions to secure a co-defendant's testimony is a legitimate
prosecutorial function); Wayne A. Logan, A Proposed Check on the Charging Dis-
cretion of Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1695, 1695; Katherine Lowe,
Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts ofAppeal 1991-1992, 81 GEo. L.J. 853, 1029-32 (1993)(see cases
cited therein); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary Sys-
tem, 1992 BYU L. REv. 669, 672; Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRInINOLOGY 717, 718 (1996).
114. See generally Melilli, supra note 113; In re Starcher, 457 S.E.2d 147, 150 (W. Va.,
1995)(citing Justice Botien's admonition that "[problems arise when the judge
ventures across the line marking the traditional division of labor between lawyer
and judge.").
115. Kaye, supra note 91, at 711 (quoting James Dao, Pataki Gains Pick as Court
Loses Judge, N.Y. TIm.s, Apr. 6, 1996, at B28).
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defense attorney or the attorneys in a civil case.1 1 6 Professor Steele
noted that this relationship sometimes takes on a "team-member"
mentality."i 7 One commentator described an incident that exempli-
fies the closeness of the relationship between the judge and the prose-
cutor. 1 8 As he describes it, the incident involved a public defender
who was allowed by the court to see a list of the cases set for trial. The
prosecutor routinely provided the list to the public defender and judge.
The public defender, however, had misplaced his list, so the judge al-
lowed him to see her list. On the list a note sticker had been placed,
apparently by the court, which stated: "State should file additional
witness and add attempted burglary charge.""i9 Another example of
the trial court assisting the prosecutor in presenting the government's
case is Missouri v. Finley.'20 In Finley, the trial court suggested to the
prosecutor that he reopen his cross-examination in order to inquire
into matters he had failed to ask about initially.' 2 ' The actions of the
judge brought him outside the role proscribed by the adversary sys-
tem, in that he assumed the role of prosecutor.' 22
United States v. Martinez'23 provides the most striking example of
the improper working relationship124 that judges and prosecutors
sometimes enjoy.' 2 5 Martinez was charged with seven counts relating
to the possession and mailing of explosives. On the third day of the
trial, during the evening recess, the trial judge met secretly in his ho-
116. See BENNETT L. GERSHmAN, PROSECUTORIAL M sCONDUCT 12-13-12-14 (1996)(il-
lustrating the problem with ex parte communications between the judge and the
prosecutor); Lubet, supra note 102, at 98; Thaxton & Rodriguez-Taseff, supra
note 1, at 191 (providing an example of an improper relationship between the
judge and prosecutor).
117. See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38
Sw. L. J. 965, 972 (1984).
118. See Thaxton & Rodriguez-Taseff, supra note 1, at 191.
119. Id. at 191.
120. 704 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
121. See id.
122. See id. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that the judge committed reversible
error when he "abandoned his time-honored role of neutrality." Id. at 684.
123. 667 F.2d 886 (10th Cir. 1981).
124. There are some examples of the close personal relationships that some courts
have had with the prosecutor assigned to their courtroom. For example, see
United States v. Berman, 28 M.J. 615 (1989)(recusing judge based on a sexual
relationship with the prosecutor). Additional close relationships include the
judge's relatives working in the prosecutor's office. See Trimble v. State, 871
S.W.2d 562 (Ark. 1994)(holding that the mere fact that that the judge's son
worked in prosecutor's office did not merit reversal).
125. Of course there are examples of a relationship that is somewhat strained. For
example, in Roberts v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 661 P.2d 1064 (Cal.
1983), a judge, upon being informed that the prosecutor would be seeking appel-
late review of the court's suppression motion, poked the prosecutor in the chest
and accused the prosecutor of being "chicken to take the case to trial," and said
"Buddy Boy, you're not going to get away with this." Id. at 1066.
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tel room1 2 6 with the prosecutors, court personnel, and several govern-
ment witnesses.12 7 Judge Winner told the prosecutor that he believed
that several spectators in the courtroom, who were sympathetic to the
defendant, were attempting to intimidate the witnesses and jury. The
judge informed the prosecutors that he wanted hidden cameras to be
installed in the courtroom to record the intimidation. Although the
court was permitted to meet ex parte regarding the protection of the
jury or witnesses,128 he went on to inform the prosecutors that he
would grant a motion for a mistrial. He cautioned the prosecutors to
make the motion after the cameras were installed and the defendant
had completed his case. The judge informed the prosecutors that he
would "provoke the defendant to request a mistrial."129 The next day
the judge again discussed this matter with the United States Attor-
ney, who had not been present during the discussion the night before.
The court indicated that it would continue to be in ex parte contact
with the prosecution.
The morning after the meeting, the prosecutor announced in court
that it had no objection to the defendant's motion for a mistrial, al-
though no motion was currently pending. The court granted the joint
motion for a mistrial. The defense attorney did not find out about the
meeting between the prosecutors and the trial judge until after the
case was set for a new trial.130 The case was reassigned to another
judge. The new trial judge dismissed four of the counts against the
defendant, finding that the consent to a mistrial had been improperly
orchestrated by the judge and prosecutor and, therefore, was not a
knowing and voluntary act by the defendant. The trial judge did not,
however, dismiss the counts that had been severed prior to trial. Both
the prosecution and the defendant appealed the ruling.131
The Martinez case is an extreme case of the "team spirit" that be-
gins to develop between judges and prosecutors. Other examples of
this team work mentality involve judges utilizing the prosecutor's
126. The case was being tried away from the judge's hometown and therefore he was
residing in a hotel. See Martinez, 667 F.2d at 888.
127. See id.
128. The courts have routinely held that a judge can meet with prosecutors to discuss
the safety of witnesses. See United States v. Adams, 785 F.2d 917 (11th Cir.
1986); Parnell v. State, 627 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. App. 1993). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 207-266 for a discussion of permissible ex parte meetings.
129. Martinez, 667 F.2d at 888. During the discussion one of the law enforcement
witnesses volunteered to cause a mistrial by giving testimony regarding evidence
that had been previously excluded. See id.
130. A news reporter alerted the attorney to the problem. See id.
131. The Tenth Circuit first affirmed the trial court's finding that the courts were
barred by the double jeopardy clause because "bad-faith conduct" by the judge
and prosecutor prodded the defendant to request a mistrial. See id. at 889.
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clerical staff to type the court's order i 3 2 or merely allowing prosecu-
tors to ghost write the order themselves. 3 3 This tandem attitude led
one judge to send a message of reassurance to the prosecutors after
the judge learned that the prosecutors were dismayed by the court's
ruling.134 The prosecutor's role and the judge's tasks merged in one
county in Georgia where the defense attorneys discovered that the
prosecutors controlled the assignment of cases and assigned the more
serious cases to former prosecutors.' 3 5 Some judges have even helped
the prosecutor in strategizing their cases.1 3 6 These cases epitomize
the mentality of some judges and prosecutors that, in many respects,
they are on the same side and are surprised that it is of concern. One
prosecutor, upon being confronted with the problem, called it "a wad of
chewing gum on the legal shoe of life."137 The source of this perspec-
tive is multifaceted.
B. Reasons for the Familiarity of the Relationship
Numerous circumstances contribute to make the working relation-
ship between the prosecutor and the court not a mirror image of the
relationship the defense attorney enjoys with the judge. Familiarity
with the prosecutor is one factor that contributes to the relationship.
Judges frequently have experience in the prosecutor's office before
their appointment to the bench.138 Upon ascending to the bench,
132. See Brown v. Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D.N.C. 1988)(finding that it was not
unusual for the judge to utilize the District Attorney's office staff to type his
orders).
133. See Kaye, supra note 91, at 711 (noting that judges routinely give prosecutors "a
blank check to say anything they want in proposed orders").
134. See Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 781 (Cal. App. 1991). According
to one news report the judge said that when he heard the reports of the prosecu-
tor's dismay over the trial court agreeing to a change of venue motion in the Rod-
ney King case, he directed his law clerk to "advise the district attorney's office not
to panic, to trust him." Richard A. Serrano, Prosecutors Won't Oppose Venue
Change, L.A. Tamms, July 25, 1991, at B1, B4 (quotation omitted) quoted in M.
Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for
Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1855, 1870
& n.52 (1993). The prosecutor in the Rodney King case, however, reported the ex
parte communication to the defense attorney and the judge was subsequently
removed from the case. See id.
135. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 96, at 782-83.
136. See, e.g., In re Starcher, 457 S.E.2d 147, 148 (W. Va. 1995)(noting that the court
telephoned prosecutor to assist him in creating his closing argument); Ryan v.
Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724, 733 (Cal. 1988) (noting how the
court encouraged prosecutor to increase charges to felony); United States v.
Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 230 (8th Cir. 1986)(discussing that between the conviction
and post-trial motions court contacted prosecutor to express concerns over the
adequacy of the trial record).
137. Bright & Keenan, supra note 96, at 783 & n.110.
138. See id. at 782 (noting an example of a judge who reached the bench through pros-
ecuting highly publicized capital cases); STUmic, supra note 28, at 159 (quoting a
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some judges find it difficult to stop being a prosecutor and continue to
prosecute from the bench.139 The judge may have worked in the pros-
ecutor's office with prosecutors who are now appearing in their
courtroom.140
Additionally, prosecutors appear daily in front of the same
judge.141 The prosecutor's duties typically involve frequent official
contact with the court.14 2 In many jurisdictions, the prosecutor's case
assignments may be based on the courtroom in which the case is being
handled.143 A group of prosecutors may be assigned to one judge and
appear in court on every matter that is assigned to that judge's court-
room. Therefore, unlike the defense attorney who leaves the court-
room after his particular case, the judge and prosecutor remain to
handle the next case. 144 This constant contact between the same
judge and prosecutor may lead the judge to consider that prosecutor
"her" prosecutor.14 5
Also, the judge and the prosecutor may consider themselves to
share a common objective.146 The entities may develop an affinity for
each other out of a sense that each is serving the public in a common
goal of efficiently and fairly processing the hundreds of cases that are
assigned to their courtroom.147 Both the judge and prosecutor benefit
from a cooperative relationship. In order to finction effectively and
efficiently each must rely on the "other's integrity, competency, and
assistance."'148 As Professor Gershman noted, the parties have the
"mutual ability to embarrass each other."'14 9 This interdependency re-
lawyer as saying "most judges are ex prosecutors, ex cops, ex officials who worked
the hard side of government....").
139. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 96, at 811; see also FRANKEL, supra note 53, at
42 (questioning whether a career in "adversary jousting" is a good foundation for
a neutral and detached judge).
140. See LAwLEss, supra note 26, at 827 (noting that the relationship between the
judge and prosecutor may stem from their mutual membership in the same local
bar associations and the social contacts that accompany that membership).
141. See id.
142. See JoHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSioNAL REsPoNsIBmrry OF THE CRMINAL
LAWYER 441 (1996).
143. See Ann Lousin, The New Ex Parte Communications Rule in Illinois: A Step For-
ward?, 19 Loy. Cm. L.J. 1031, 1043 (1988)(discussing the assignment of prosecu-
tors in Cook County, Illinois).
144. See GERsHFmN, supra note 116, at 12-13.
145. See Steele, supra note 117. CInunAL JUSTICE STANDARD 3-2.8 (b) recognizes that
"[a] prosecutor's duties necessarily involve frequent and regular official contacts
with the judge or judges of the prosecutor's jurisdiction." STANDARDS, supra note
11, at 540.
146. See GERsHMAN, supra note 116, at 12-13.
147. See id.; see also Steele, supra note 117, at 973 (noting the greater affinity between
judge and lawyer in criminal cases than in civil cases).




quires the judge and prosecutor to work together on a variety of mat-
ters in and out of the courtroom.
The judge and the prosecutor develop a close working relationship,
in part, because they communicate routinely in court and in cham-
bers. The courts have recognized several issues upon which the judge
and prosecutor can communicate privately.150 This variety of issues
routinely brings the prosecutor in contact with the judge in the ab-
sence of a defense counsel.151 These permissible conversations offer
the opportunity for the judge and prosecutor to speak privately upon a
variety of issues. Even the most conscientious judge may begin to form
a bond with a prosecutor who she privately sees routinely in her
chambers. These occasions foster a sense of collaboration and coopera-
tion that lead to the "team spirit."
C. Problems With Too Close of a Relationship
Although the relationship between judge and prosecutor should be
one of cooperation in seeing that justice is administered fairly and ex-
pediently, their independence must be maintained. Judges and prose-
cutors have shared objectives, but many times they do not share in
their assessment of priorities. Most judges experience at least some
pressure to move cases through the system quickly. Although the
prosecutor should be aware of the need to act expediently, it clearly
cannot be the primary motivation for his actions. The prosecutor must
temper the need for expedient disposal of cases with the needs of the
system and victims. Occasionally, the prosecutor must be willing to
assert a position that is contrary to the judge's insistence on speedy
processing of the cases.
Additionally, judges and prosecutors must maintain independence
in their decision-making process. The adversary process assumes that
both sides present their case to a neutral tribunal. It is important
that the judge and the prosecutor work independently, even though
150. Professor Gershman identifies the following matters: "authorizing search, arrest,
eavesdropping and other investigative warrants; impaneling and supervising
grand jury proceedings; signing orders to extradite defendants or commit to cus-
tody material witnesses; issuing subpoenas for witnesses and documents." Id.
Professor Lubet identifies several permissible ex parte contacts:
In civil cases these include emergency motions, such as requests for tem-
porary restraining orders. In criminal cases, applications for search
warrants and grand jury proceedings typically take place without the
presence of the defendant. Ex parte judgments may be entered against
parties who are in default and of course the court may generally proceed
where parties have had notice, but have failed to appear. None of these
situations are covered by the Model Code's ban on ex parte
communications.
Lubet, supra note 102, at 96 & n.2; see HALL, supra note 142, at 441.




they work together. When the relationship becomes too close, the
court "enters the fray and becomes a "crime fighter," not a neutral
decision-maker.152
Justice Marshall in his dissent to Illinois v. Sommerville153 implic-
itly noted the close relationship between judges and prosecutors.' 5 4
He was concerned that this relation made judges reluctant to find that
prosecutors had intentionally manipulated the availability of their
witnesses.15 5 Independence between the judge and prosecutor is nec-
essary in a system that values the separate roles of the judge and
prosecutor.
Of course, the close relationship between the prosecutor and the
judge not only actually affects the proper functioning of the adversary
system but it also causes the system to appear unfair. Justice Frank-
furter once observed that "[tlhe appearance of impartiality is an es-
sential manifestation of its reality."'156 Professor Abramson suggests
that "[w]ithout the appearance as well as the fact ofjustice, respect for
the law vanishes in a democracy."'15 7
The Appearance of Impropriety Standard persisted in the Judicial
Code even though it was excluded from the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Canon 2 of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct
states: "[a] Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Im-
propriety in All of the Judge's Activities."'15 The commentary to Ca-
non 2 states the test for applying the Appearance of Impropriety
Standard: "[tihe test for appearance of impropriety is whether the con-
duct would create, in reasonable minds, a perception that the judge's
ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality
and competence is impaired."'15 9 The focus of Canon 2(A) is the need
for public trust in the independence and impartiality of the judici-
152. Kaye, supra note 91, at 711 (observing that the judge must stay out of the fray
and not see herself as a crime fighter).
153. 410 U.S. 458, 481 (1973).
154. See id. at 481.
155. See id.
156. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cf
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)(stating that "justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice").
157. Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MRQ. L. REv.
949, 962-63 (1996)(citations omitted).
158. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
159. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. [21 (1990). The American
Bar Association rejected several paragraphs which included the following ideas:
1) acts which violated a "clear and accepted community standard;" and 2) a list of
examples that were not "per se violations but nonetheless would taint the judici-
ary." Kaye, supra note 91, at 953 n.15 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
7-8 (Discussion Draft 1989)).
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ary.i 6o In order for a judge to possess the confidence of the commu-
nity, "justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done."16 1
A close relationship between the judge and prosecutor may appear
to be improper even if no improper conduct is taking place. Citizens
evaluate the system by its representatives.i 62 Experienced partici-
pants in the system recognize that litigants must believe in the fair-
ness of the system.' 6 3 "No one likes to lose, but if an unfavorable
decision is perceived to be the result of an impartial consideration, it is
usually unbearable."' 6 4 The citizen that observes a friendly relation-
ship between the judge and the prosecutor may question the fairness
of that proceeding. The Appearance of Impropriety Standard requires
judges to consider not only the effect of their conduct, but also the
effect of their perceived conduct on the public's impression of the sys-
tem.'6 5 "[Blioth the ability of courts to influence the structure of law
and the ability of the police and other government officials to enforce
the law depend upon public satisfaction with, confidence in, and trust
of legal authorities."166
Probably the most serious danger of a prosecutor/judge relation-
ship that has grown too cooperative is the opportunity for, and the
160. See Irving R. Kaufman, Lions and Jackals: the Function of a Code of Judicial
Ethics, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 4 (1970); see also Brain Holland, The Code
of Judicial Conduct and The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: A Comparison
of Ethical Codes For Judges and Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCs 725, 726
(1989).
161. In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 753 (Mich. 1977)(citations omitted); see also
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)("to perform its high function in the best
way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."); United States v. Berman,
28 M.J. 615, 618 (1989)("Purity of heart is not enough. Judges' robes must be as
spotless as their actual conduct."); Brian T. Fitzgerald, Sealed v. Sealed:A Public
Court System Going Secretly Private, 6 J.L. & POL. 381, 398 (1990)(concluding
that "one of the most important policies underlying open courts [is] the mainte-
nance of public confidence in the judicial process.").
162. See Tamminen v. Texas 653 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Teague, J.,
dissenting)(commenting that "[olur criminal justice system is already burdened
with too high degree of public skepticism about its fairness." Justice Teague
went on to suggest that judges and prosecutors must keep themselves "above sus-
picion in which their fairness and integrity could appear to be compromised.")
163. In re Colony Square Company, 60 B.R. 1003, 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
164. Id.
165. See Stephen M. Simon & Maury S. Landsman, Judicial Ethics Simulation Based
Training, 58 LAw & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 323, 329 (1996)(noting that even
when a judge's action can be justified as in the interest ofjudicial efficiency or an
action in good faith, the courts conclude that an appearance of impropriety may
result in a "diminution of public confidence.")
166. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & Soc'y REv. 51, 51 (1984). One commentator ob-
served that "the appearance that the justice system distributes fairly has much to
do with the public's acceptance of the judicial system and the public's perception
of its legitimacy." Kerri L. Mover, "Order Opinions" - The Public's Perception of
Injustice, 21 WM. MITcHELL L. REv. 1225, 1226 (1996).
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occurrence of, improper ex parte communications.i 6 7 The close rela-
tionship between the prosecutor and the judge can lead to the unethi-
cal practice of improper ex parte communications. Prosecutors and
courts engage in a number of permissive ex parte communications.1 68
As a direct result of the close relationship that often exists between
the prosecutor and the judge, however, improper ex parte communica-
tions can routinely happen.1 69
IV. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS: THE ANTITHESIS OF THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM
A. Definition of Improper Ex Parte Communications
An ex parte communication occurs when the court meets with only
one side of a controversy.'7 0 In order for an ex parte conversation to
occur there must be a pending matter.i 71 The term ex parte means
"one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the
application of, one party only."'17 2 As the Supreme Court of West Vir-
ginia recognized, the "very act of talking to one party without the pres-
ence of the other creates an ex parte situation."' 73 The result of the
167. This is not to suggest that ex parte conversations do not occur between the judge
and defense attorneys. See In re Gumaer, 867 P.2d 850 (Ariz. 1994); In re Dam-
ron, 487 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1986); In re Berk, 297 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1980). One famous
case involved a judge meeting with a defense attorney who, in reality was an
undercover FBI agent who was involved in the Operation Greylord investigation.
Although the court refused to accept any bribery payments, he was suspended for
the ex parte conversations with the undercover attorney. See In re Laurie, 2 M11.
Cts Com'n 91 (1985) as reported in Lubet, supra note 102, at 98.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 208-240.
169. See Hailer v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969)(noting that the relation-
ship between the prosecutor and judge provided the opportunity and the environ-
ment wherein ex parte disclosures could occur); LAwLEss, supra note 26, at 828
(pointing out that ex parte contacts are "a serious problem, difficult to discover
and even more difficult to combat"); Lubet, supra note 102, at 97 (noting that ex
parte communications between judges and attorneys occur all too frequently);
United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 70 (5th Cir. 1975)(noting some prosecutors
believe that ex parte relationships are an accepted practice).
170. See L. Ashley Lyu, Getting at the Truth: Adversarial Hearings in Batson Inquir-
ies, 57 FoRDHAi L. REv. 725 (1989); see also Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508 (3d Cir.
1995)(fLnding the trial court's discussion with the prosecutor and State Supreme
Court Chief Justice, after which the trial judge reversed his earlier exclusionary
ruling, to be an improper ex parte communication).
171. See In re Smith, 670 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Or. 1983); People v. Laue, 182 Cal. Rptr. 99
(Ct. App. 1982)(stating that an after sentencing matter is not pending).
172. In re Tesmer, 580 N.W. 2d 307, 317 (Wis. 1998); see also United States v. Burger,
773 F. Supp. 289, 293 (D. Kan. 1991)(noting the distinction between letters from
victim which are contained in the persistence report and conversations with pros-
ecution, finding that the letters from the victims did not constitute ex parte com-
munications); United States v. Meriwether, 486 F.2d 498, 596 (5th Cir. 1973).
173. In re Kaufman, 416 S.E.2d 480,485 (W. Va. 1992); In re Starcher, 457 S.E.2d 147,
150 (W. Va. 1995).
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conversation does not effect whether it is ex parte.17 4 The term ex
parte reflects the absence of any person who may be adversely inter-
ested in the conversation.175
In State v. Lotter,17 6 the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the
definition of an ex parte conversation. John Lotter was convicted after
trial and sentenced to death.177 During the trial, the judge and prose-
cutor met with a prospective witness178 in order to assure him that if
he testified he would not receive the death penalty.179 Counsel for
Lotter was not present at the meeting, although he was notified of the
resulting agreement.'s 0 The defendant appealed his conviction,
claiming, among several issues, that the meeting was an improper ex
parte meeting because he was not present.'18
The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the judge and prosecutor
had participated in an ex parte meeting.'8 2 The court held that "an ex
parte communication occurs when a judge communicates with any
person concerning a pending or impending proceeding without notice
to an adverse party."' 83 Because the sole purpose of the meeting was
to secure testimony against Lotter, the court found that Lotter's inter-
ests were adverse to those of the State and witness. Therefore, the
communication was ex parte.184
Even conversations that occur between the judge and prosecutor to
discuss co-defendants may be ex parte if the conversation might influ-
ence the judge regarding the defendant.185 In Caldwell v. State, the
defendant was charged along with twelve other people in a "compli-
174. See People ex rel Rosner v. Warden, 384 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1976), Yohn v. Love, 76
F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Burrows, 629 P.2d 820, 826 (Or. 1981); In re Bell,
655 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982); Ryan v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 754 P.2d 724
(Cal. 1988); Lubet, supra note 102, at 97.
175. See BLAcis LAW DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979); Lyu, supra note 170, at 733; In
re Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d 307, 317 (Wis. 1998)(finding conversation between judge
and law professor to be ex parte conversation); Strutz v, McNagny, 558 N.E.2d
1103, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)(finding a meeting not ex parte merely because
party's co-counsel was not present).
176. 255 Neb 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998).
177. See id. at 461, 586 N.W.2d at 603. The defendant was convicted on three counts
of first degree murder, three counts of the use of a weapon to commit a felony and
one count of burglary.
178. See id. It is unclear whether the witness's attorney was present, however the
issue was not the lack of the witness's attorney but rather the absence of Lotter's
attorney.
179. See id. at 473, 586 N.W.2d at 609. The witness had already been convicted of




183. Id. at 473, 586 N.W.2d at 609-10.
184. See id. at 474, 586 N.W.2d at 610.
185. See Caldwell v. State, 445 A.2d 1069 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
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cated scenario" involving a theft ring.' s 6 The trial judge and prosecu-
tor admitted meeting together ex parte to discuss the sentences of two
co-defendants; but they insisted that they did not discuss the defen-
dant's sentence.' 8 7 Because all the defendants' conduct was interre-
lated, however, the appellate court found that it could not say with
certainty that the conversation about the co-defendants did not influ-
ence the judge's decision in imposing sentence on the defendant.
Therefore, the conversation was ex parte and the defendant's sentence
was vacated.1 8 8
Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers and the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct address improper ex parte communi-
cations. Model Rule 3.5 generally states the prohibition that "a law-
yer shall not communicate ex parte with a [judge] except as permitted
by law."' 8 9 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(7) states
that:
A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceed-
ing or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge
shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties
concerning a pending or impending proceeding. 190
The courts have repeatedly condemned ex parte communications
between judges and prosecutors.191 Prohibited conduct prior to the
trial and during trial includes providing to the judge a memorandum
186. Id. at 1071.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1072.
189. MODEL RuLE OF PROFEssIONAL CoNnucT 3.5(b) in STANDARDS, supra note 11, at
68; see HALL, supra note 142, at 633 (commenting on the generally nature of the
prohibition in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct). The Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility was more specific. It stated in Disciplinary Rule 7-110(b):
In adversary proceedings a lawyer shall not communicate or cause
another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or an
official before whom a proceeding is pending, except:
1. in the course of official proceedings in the cause;
2. in writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing
counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer;
3. orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse
party if he is not represented by a lawyer; or
4. as otherwise authorized by law.
STANDARDs, supra note 11, at 238.
190. MODEL CODE OF JuDIcIAL CoNDucT in STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 638.
191. See Demarest v. Price, 130 F.3d 922 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Thompson,
827 F.2d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 1987)(noting that adversary proceedings are the
rule and ex parte proceedings are disfavored); United States v. Wolfson, 634 F.2d
1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977)(noting that
use of ex parte proceeding to deprive grand jury witness of his right to counsel);
United States v. Miller, 495 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Palermo,
410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969); Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1969);
Rosner v. Warden, 384 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1976).
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on the issues in the case,19 2 seeking a change in bond conditions,193
and discussions with the appellate court in the presence of the trial
court.' 9 4 Additionally, the courts have prohibited meeting with the
sentencing judge to discuss sentencing, 95 presenting exhibits to the
court, 1 9 6 asking law enforcement to speak directly to the judge,197 and
submitting an order for the court's signature without sending it to op-
posing counsel.' 98
Although the courts have denounced improper contact before the
verdict, few cases have overturned convictions based on a finding of an
ex parte communication.' 99 The courts have required a showing of
actual prejudice by the defendant in order to warrant a reversal. 200 In
the absence of a showing that the prosecutor's conduct "affected the
fairness of the trial," the courts have been reluctant to reverse the
defendant's conviction.20 '
192. See Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1976); Florida Bar v. Mason,
334 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976). But see Commonwealth v. Perkins, 401 A.2d 1320, 1322
(Pa. 1979)(finding nothing improper in the prosecutor providing the court with
legal authority prior to trial.)
193. See United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1119 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Burrows,
629 P.2d 820 (Or. 1981).
194. See Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1996).
195. See United States v. Wolfson, 634 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1980); Haller v. Robbins,
409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969).
196. See Egelak v. State, 438 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1968).
197. See United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Riley, 691
P.2d 695, 699-700 (Ariz. 1984).
198. See In re Judd, 629 P.2d 435 (Utah 1981); HALL, supra note 142, at 634.
199. See United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1990)(stating that the
adversary process is satisfied when the defendant is given an opportunity to dis-
pute the prosecutions allegations contained in pre-trial motion to disqualify de-
fendant's counsel); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 858 (2d Cir. 1983);
Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. DeLeo,
422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1970)(finding no prejudice when the court met with prose-
cutor ex parte to discuss the prosecutor's illness); GEaasHmA, supra note 116, at
12-15. But see Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1996)(granting relief where
prosecutor and trial judge discussed with Chief Supreme Court judge the trial
court's refusal to admit crucial evidence causing the trial judge to reverse his
earlier ruling); United States v. Minsky, 963 F.2d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 1992)(revers-
ing conviction based in part on an ex parte conversation between the trial judge
and prosecutor during trial regarding what statements must be turned over to
the defendant); United States v. Martinez, 667 F.2d 886 (10th Cir. 1981)(revers-
ing conviction and barring retrial based on strategy meeting between judge and
prosecutor during trial).
200. See United States v. Manko, 979 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Earley,
746 F.2d 412, 417-19 (8th Cir. 1984); Walsh, 700 F.2d at 858; Grieco, 533 F.2d at
718 (finding no violation of due process where the defendant could not show any
prejudice from prosecutor submitting ex parte a trial memorandum); United
States v. Persico, 349 F.2d 6, 13 (2d Cir. 1965).
201. Walsh, 700 F.2d at 857. But see Captain Alan D. Chute, Due Process and Un-
available Evidence, 118 MIL. L. Rav. 93, 136 (1987)(noting that in the military
courts a presumption of prejudice is created by any ex parte conversation and the
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On the other hand, the courts are particularly concerned about ex
parte conversations that occur before sentencing.2 02 The prosecutor is
required to prove that the conversation with the judge did not influ-
ence his decision.203 The courts have recognized that the information
conveyed may be misleading, inaccurate or inadmissible. 204 Even if
the information is subsequently relayed in open court, the defendant's
rights are prejudiced by the prior ex parte conversation because the
state "got its pitch in first."2 05 Finally, the courts recognize that re-
gardless of the actual prejudice, an ex parte conversation "shadows
the appearance of impartiality of any judicial proceeding."2 06
B. Permissible Ex Parte Communications
Although the courts have affirmed that ex parte conversations are
a "dangerous procedure,"207 still many legal occasions allow prosecu-
tors to meet ex parte with the judge.2 08 Both the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct for lawyers and the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
explicitly permit certain ex parte communications. The lawyers' ethi-
cal rules allow ex parte communications that are "permitted by
law."2 09 The judicial code permits conversations "for scheduling, ad-
ministrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substan-
tive matters or issues on the merits."21 0
burden is on the prosecutor to prove that the defendant's rights were not
affected).
202. See GERsHmAN, supra note 116, at 12-15.
203. See United States v. Reese, 775 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Alver-
son, 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wolfson, 634 F.2d 1217 (9th
Cir. 1980); Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969). But see McKenzie
v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994)(holding that the defendant had
the burden of showing that an improper ex parte conversation occurred during a
45 minute meeting between the prosecutor and judge after trial but before the
death penalty phase); Amber A. Bell, McKenzie v. Day: Is Twenty Years on Death
Row Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 26 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 41 (1996)(dis-
cussing McKenzie from the 8th Amendment perspective).
204. See Haller, 409 F.2d at 859; Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.
1968)(finding that prosecutor conveyed illegally obtained information);
GERsm N, supra note 116, at 12-14; HALL, supra note 142, at 633; Lubet, supra
note 102, at 96.
205. Hailer, 409 F.2d at 859 (stating that mere presence of attorney does not eliminate
taint); see United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1119 (7th Cir. 1970). But see
People v. Shabazz, 667 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)(finding no
prejudice where the court relayed to the pro se defendant the content of the con-
versation and allowed him to rebut the factual allegations which he did not do).
206. Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 719 (1st Cir. 1976).
207. Haller, 409 F.2d at 859.
208. See HALL, supra note 142, at 440.
209. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT 3.5(b) in STANDARDS, supra note 11, at
68.
210. Canon 3(B)(7), MODEL CODE OF JUDIcIAL CoNDucT in STANDADS, supra note 11,
at 638. The judicial cannon requires, however, that prior to the ex parte conver-
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1. Communications Permitted by Law
The courts have addressed those ex parte communications that are
"permitted by law." The courts have identified three areas where
judges and prosecutors may meet ex parte: investigation matters, dis-
covery issues, and safety issues.
Several occasions during the investigative stage of a criminal case
may require the court and prosecutor to meet ex parte.2 11 Ex parte
submission of arrest warrants, search warrants, and wiretap applica-
tions are authorized by law.21 2 Although many times these docu-
ments may be created by the law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor
may present these documents for approval or may accompany the law
enforcement official to the chambers of the judge in order to obtain an
approval of a warrant.
The activities of the grand jury also present circumstances in
which the prosecutor will meet with the court alone. Grand jury pro-
ceedings are conducted in secret and are therefore handled predomi-
nately without the presence of the defendant or his attorney.21 3 The
courts have recognized a variety of issues regarding grand juries when
the prosecutor may present information to the court ex parte. Several
courts have permitted the ex parte submission of information support-
ing the issuance of grand jury subpoenas for attorney records.2 14
Additionally, many discovery matters are determined in camera
and ex parte. Judges and prosecutors meet privately on discovery
sation the court must "reasonable believe that no party will gain a procedural or
tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication." Id. Finally, the
cannon commands the judge to make provisions promptly to notify all other par-
ties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allow an opportunity to
respond. See id.
211. See United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978)(finding that ex
parte communication necessary to protect the investigation); Glynn v. Donnelly,
485 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1973)(discussing ex parte conference to assist in securing a
witness); see generally Flowers, Code of Their Own, supra note 11 (discussing
involvement of judges and prosecutors in the early stages of the investigation).
212. See GERSHMAN, supra note 116, at 12-15; see also Michael Todd King, Expanding
the Courts' Power to Preserve Forfeitable Assets: The Pretrial Restraint of Substi-
tute Assets Under RICO and CCE, 29 GA. L. REv. 245, 269 (1994)(noting the use
of ex parte restraining orders to preserve defendant's substantive assets for for-
feiture). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a) provides for ex parte warrant
applications. See HALL, supra note 142, at 635.
213. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 867 (1966)(recog-
nizing the "long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings in federal courts."); SARA SUN BEATi & WLLIA C. BRYSON ET AL.,
GRAND JuRY LAW AND PRACTCE, 5-2 (2d ed. 1999); Susan R. Klein & Katherine P.
Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and Compound Criminal Statues: A Func-
tional Test, 77 Tsx. L. REv. 333, 396 (1998).




matters ranging from disclosure issues to national security.2 15 Rule
16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for ex
parte communications in discovery matters.2 16 The Notes of the Advi-
sory Committee on Rules indicate that ex parte proceedings are disfa-
vored, but necessary "if any adversary proceeding would defeat the
purpose of the protective or modifying order."217
In the area of national security, Congress has specifically author-
ized ex parte communication between the prosecutor and the court.21 8
The Classified Information Protection Act ("CIPA)219 created a pre-
trial procedure that enables the court to review classified documents
to ascertain whether they are discoverable before they are revealed to
the defendant.220 The courts have recognized that "an adversary
hearing with the defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of
the discovery rules."22 ' Although the rule speaks in terms of review of
documents and written submissions, 22 2 the practical reality is that
prosecutors meet with judges to explain the danger to national secur-
ity and the lack of relevance of the documents. 2 23 The Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria recognized that the participa-
tion of the prosecutor in ex parte hearings under CIPA was appropri-
215. See United States v. Lee, 648 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981).
216. FED. R. CPRm. P. 16(d)(1) provides:
C. Regulation of Discovery
1. Protective and Modifying Orders. Upon sufficient showing the
court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied,
restricted, or deferred of make such order as appropriate. Upon motion
by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in
whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by
the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following
such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall
be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
217. Id.
218. See United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984).
219. Classified Information Protection Act 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 4 (1994) provides in
part:
The court may permit the United States to make a written request for an
authorization to delete specified items in discoverable documents in the
form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone. If the
court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing,
the entire text of the statement of the United States shall be sealed and
preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appel-
late court in the event of an appeal.
Id.
220. See United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987)(discussing the ex parte nature of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.)
221. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965; see United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st
Cir. 1984).
222. See supra note 216 for content of the rule.
223. See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C. 1989).
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ate to answer any questions the court may have regarding the
classified documents.2 24
Further, the courts have approved prosecutors submitting ex parte
materials for a determination by the court as to whether the materials
are exculpatory and therefore discoverable. 2 25 The courts have rou-
tinely recognized that the submission of questionable Brady material
224. See Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1261.
225. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme Court mandated that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon re-
quest violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Subse-
quent cases have mandated that the prosecution must provide exculpatory evi-
dence whether or not the defendant requests it and that the test to define what
evidence should be disclosed is the same. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667 (1985). The Constitution does not require an open file policy, but requires
that evidence which is both favorable to the defendant on the issue of guilt or
punishment and is material to be provided. A prosecutor must consider all evi-
dence in his possession in light of these two requirements. The prosecutor bears
the responsibility to assess whether information in his possession is both
favorable to the defendant and material. If he determines that he does possess
such evidence, he is constitutionally mandated to disclose it to the defense. The
court has stressed that the mandates of Brady and its progeny require the prose-
cutor to consider the evidence collectively and not item by item. See Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 420 (1995). This rule leaves the prosecution "With a de-
gree of discretion" and also imposes "a corresponding burden." Id.
Obviously, some evidence is clearly favorable to the defendant. Clearly a sci-
entific test that indicated that the defendant could not have been the source of
the semen found on the victim, or a witness who clearly establishes the defen-
dant's alibi, is favorable. Additionally, evidence that goes to the credibility of a
witness is considered to be favorable and therefore the prosecution must disclose
it. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). Determinations of
favorability are much more difficult, however, when evidence is inconclusive or
neutral. The courts have not required neutral or inconclusive evidence to be dis-
closed. Evidence is not defined as favorable merely because it weakens the prose-
cution's case. The fact that a witness has died may not be evidence that is
favorable on the issue of guilt, and therefore need not be disclosed. See People v.
Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76 (1978). Additionally, the prosecutor must assess whether the
evidence is material. The Supreme Court in Bagley found that "evidence is mate-
rial only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Reasonable probability means a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." Id. The Supreme Court appeared to define materiality more
broadly in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) by stating "[t]he question is
not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, un-
derstood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. The Supreme
Court requires the prosecutor to "gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence
and make disclosure when the point of 'reasonable probability' is reached." Kyles,
514 U.S. at 437. This standard appears to place more discretion in the hands of
prosecutors. However, the more prudent approach of"when in doubt, give it out"
has been endorsed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,




to the court for in camera review is prudent.226 These submissions,
however, often lead to ex parte communications between the judge
and prosecutor.2 27 The court in Storer Communications, Inc. v.
Presser recognized the need to present the materials to the trial court
to determine whether they were exculpatory; it disapproved, however,
the practice of government counsel meeting with the judge ex parte on
the Brady materials. 2 28
Finally, the courts have recognized the necessity of ex parte com-
munications regarding the safety of witnesses.229 In United States v.
Napue,2 30 the Seventh Circuit recognized that in determining issues
involving the safety of witnesses the trial court has discretion in deter-
mining the extent that ex parte proceedings are necessary. The defen-
dant, Irving Napue, had requested that the prosecution provide a list
of potential witnesses.2 3 x The prosecution objected to providing a wit-
ness list, citing defendant's dangerousness. The prosecutor met with
the trial judge ex parte on three occasions to describe the basis of their
allegations that Napue posed a threat to the safety of the witnesses.
Additionally, the prosecutor filed an ex parte written submission with
specific allegations. The defendant was notified of each of these ex
parte communications, but was not permitted to be present. Although
the Napue court discouraged ex parte communications, it went on to
acknowledge that ex parte communications are warranted where alle-
gations regarding the safety of witnesses are serious.232
In United States v. Adams,23 3 the court attempted to define the
limits of the communications permitted between the prosecutor and
the court regarding witnesses. In Adams, the defendants were
226. See Storer Communications, Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Du-
puy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1501 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Holmes, 722 F.2d 37,
41 (4th Cir. 1983).
227. See Storer, 828 F.2d at 332; United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1188 (9th
Cir. 1980).
228. See Storer, 828 F.2d at 335.
229. See United States v. Sai Keung Wong, 886 F.2d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Adams, 785 F.2d
917, 920-21 (11th Cir. 1986); LaChappelle v. Moran, 699 F.2d 560, 566 (1st Cir.
1983)(finding a judge acted responsibly when he met ex parte with the complain-
ant who was a minor testifying against her father in a rape case); United States
v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1000 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Arroyo-Angulo,
580 F.2d 1137, 1143-44 (2d Cir. 1978); Parnell v. Florida, 627 So. 2d 1246, 1247
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)(finding that the trial court had no choice but to conduct
an ex parte hearing in order to ensure the safety of the witnesses).
230. 834 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1987).
231. See id. at 1316.
232. See id.
233. 785 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1986).
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charged based on their participation in an auto theft ring.2 34 The
judge and prosecutor met with a witness during the course of the trial
because the witness had refused to testify.23 5 Neither the defendant
nor defense counsel was permitted to be present.236 During the course
of the conversation between the judge, prosecutor, and witness, the
prosecutor agreed to enroll the witness in the FBI Witness Protection
Program. After the witness agreed to testify, the prosecutor, in the
presence of the judge, attempted to impress on the witness the impor-
tant distinction between being paid to testify and merely being offered
protection. The prosecutor sought to encourage the witness to testify,
and that he had not been paid for his testimony in any way.2 3 7 The
witness subsequently took the witness stand and testified regarding
the defendant's involvement 23s and the defendant was convicted.239
234. See id. The defendants were charged with one count of mail fraud pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2312; twenty-two counts of interstate sale of stolen motor vehicles, pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. § 2313; thirteen counts of interstate transportation of stolen
property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2314; and one count of conspiracy, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 371. See id.
235. See Adams, 785 F.2d at 919. The witness had been granted use immunity, cited
for contempt, and jailed for four days prior to the private meeting with the judge
and prosecutor.
236. See id. The witness was first interviewed in the presence of defense counsel.
However, when the witness indicated that he was in fear for his life if he testified,
the court excused defense counsel. The defense counsel did not object at that
time to being excluded from the conference. See id.
237. See id. The following transcript of the conversation is reported in the case:
PROSECUTOR: I want something understood, judge. rm not willing to
pay him for his testimony. There is a distinction between the two. rm
willing to help you any way I can with your safety, but rm not willing to
pay for your testimony. I don't want that in any way construed as he's
being paid in return for his testimony. As long as he testifies truthfully
under oath, I don't care what he says.
THE COURT: Well, that's right, and I don't either. That's exactly right,
as long as it's the truth.
PROSECUTOR: You understand, now, if they ask you have you been
paid anything by the Government, I haven't paid you; rm not paying you
to testify. rm helping you out, because you think you're in fear of your
life. If they ask that question, then that's another issue, but I don't want
it perceived that I'm paying you.
THE COURT: If they ask you anything, have you received anything,
that could be what he'd want to tell them.
PROSECUTOR: I think what he should say is no, he hasn't, although
he's made application for the witness security program, if that's an ap-
propriate answer at the time.
THE COURT: It depends on what's appropriate at the time he testifies,
whatever you tell them.
Id.
238. See id. The defendant was notified prior to the witness's testimony that the pros-
ecutor had promised to enroll him in the witness protection program. During the
course of the direct and cross-examinations, the prosecutor and witness indicated
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction because it found that
the participants in the ex parte conference had followed procedures to
insure that the defendant's rights were not violated.240 The court reit-
erated that the use of ex parte conferences should be unusual. Fur-
ther, the court found that the trial judge should not have continued
the ex parte meeting during the "witness coaching." The trial court,
according to the court of appeals, should terminate the ex parte con-
versation as soon as he has received all of the information necessary to
protect the witness.
Ex parte conversations between judges and prosecutors can be jus-
tified on the grounds of safety, discovery, and national security. These
areas pose sensitive issues that a judge must review before disclosing
them to the defense. 241 If an adversary proceeding was required, the
need for the judicial review would be defeated, as the matter the pros-
ecutor sought to keep secret would be revealed. If the court subse-
quently decided the matter need not or should not be revealed, the
damage would already have been done.2 42 Therefore, the costs 24 3 to
the adversary system are justified.
Although ex parte conversations regarding sensitive disclosure is-
sues are justifiable, conversations on procedure and scheduling are
not. The mere expediency of dealing with only one party244 does not
substantiate the costs and risk that are attached to this way of
proceeding.
2. Communications Not on the Merits
The courts have routinely distinguished ex parte conversation on
procedural issues, which the courts deem proper, and those conversa-
tions that are on the merits, which the courts deem improper.245
that the only promise was that the prosecutor would seek to enroll the witness in
the protection program. Neither related to the prosecutor's pledge to seek imme-
diate protection if necessary. See id. at 920-21.
239. Defendant Adams was found guilty of three counts of interstate transportation of
a stolen vehicle and one count of conspiracy. See id. at 918.
240. See id. at 920. The court noted that the substance of the witness's inculpatory
testimony was not discussed and that the entire conference was transcribed.
241. See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Napue,
834 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir.
1984); Parnell v. State, 627 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
242. See FED. R. CRn. P. 16.
243. See infra text accompanying notes 272-295.
244. See comment 7 to Model Rules of Judicial Conduct 3(B)(7) which suggests that
these communications may facilitate scheduling and other administrative mat-
ters. See STANDARDs, supra note 11, at 638.
245. See United States v. Hussin, No. 89-2243, 1990 WL 47540 (6th Cir. Apr. 17,
1990); United States v. Brierley, 315 F. Supp. 1392 (W.D. Pa. 1970); People v.
Shabazz, 246 A.2d 831, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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Scheduling matters have been recognized as procedural and therefore
are routinely discussed ex parte. 246 The American Bar Association
Standards acknowledge the need for communications between the
court and the prosecutor on scheduling matters. Standard 3-5.1
states: "control over the trial calendar should be vested in the court.
The prosecuting attorney should advise the court of facts relevant in
determining the order of cases on the court's calendar."247
The court in United States v. Hussin248 held that conversations be-
tween the judge and prosecutor about the absence of a witness were
not improper because they were not on the merits. The trial court
made this distinction on the record:
It had nothing to do with the merits of this case. It had nothing to do with
anything in this case except the absence of this witness... I don't think it is
the type of an ex parte communication that is forbidden by the Rules because
it was not an ex parte communication on any of the merits of this lawsuit.
2 4 9
The Sixth Circuit concluded that it should determine the prejudice
to the defendant based on the effect of the conversation to his due pro-
cess rights.250 The court determined that the conversations regarding
procedure did not have a reasonably substantial relation to "the ful-
ness of his [the defendant's] opportunity to defend against the
charge."25' The Florida Supreme Court, in Rose v. Florida,252 distin-
guished improper ex parte communications on the merits and proper
conversation that were "strictly administrative matters not dealing in
any way with the merits of the case."2 53
The problem with the distinction between private conversations on
procedure and conversations on the merits is threefold. First, the dis-
tinction between the two is not often clear. The definition of "on the
merits" clearly refers to the subject matter of the communication and
not the phase of the proceedings.254 One court limited the merits of a
proceeding to those defined by the "legal rights and duties of the par-
ties as they are disclosed by the pleadings and evidence." 255 However,
246. See MODEL JUDICIAL CODE, Canon 3(B)(7) in STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 638.
Comment 7 suggests ex parte communications might facilitate scheduling or
other administrative matters. See id. at 639; United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d
487 (1st Cir. 1970).
247. CRMUNAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Standard 3-5.1, in STANDARDS, supra note 11, at
548.
248. No. 89-2243, 1990 WL 47540 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1990). United States v. Hussin is
an unpublished disposition cited in a table at 900 F.2d 260.
249. Id. at *1.
250. See id.
251. Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)).
252. 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992).
253. Id. at 1183 (emphasis omitted).
254. See In re Burrows, 629 P.2d 820 (Or. 1981); In re Smith, 670 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Or.
1983); HALL, supra note 142, at 634.
255. In re Smith, 670 P.2d at 1020.
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the content of the communication is important to determine whether
the risks of ex parte communications, namely improper influence or
inaccurate information, have occurred. 256 It is sometimes difficult to
determine whether a discussion on procedural matters has affected
the rights or duties of the parties. 257
Decisions on procedure can advantage one party or disadvantage
another. In Hussin,25s the ex parte conversation occurred shortly
before the trial was to begin. The court and the prosecutors discussed
the absence of a crucial witness that the prosecutors had allowed to
leave the jurisdiction.259 The conversation resulted in an adjourn-
ment of the trial. Although the actual granting of the continuance oc-
curred after argument in open court, the defense objected to the
procedure. The defense attorney rightly suggested to the court that
the ex parte communication "'did touch on the question of adjourn-
ment'" which he felt "'created an appearance of impropriety' at a criti-
cal stage in the proceedings." 260
Justice Harding, in his concurring opinion in Rose v. State,261 rec-
ognized that even scheduling matters can afford one party an advan-
tage or disadvantage. He noted that because of the crowded dockets
and calendars of most judges, the scheduling of matters might affect
the parties. He suggested that, even in scheduling matters, the court
should strive to avoid ex parte communications. 262
Finally, a proper conversation can quickly evolve into an improper
one. Justice William Berry, a former member of the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court, describes just such an instance in his book Justice For
Sale.263 The attorney, according to Justice Berry, indicated that he
wanted to discuss the procedure for cases seeking original jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court. Because the Judge was new to the bench, he
thought such a conversation might be helpful. He describes the con-
versation like this:
ir. Doe then went on to explain how the Supreme Court might reach down
into one of the lower courts and either stop the action, or ask certain questions
that might save an appeal later.
256. See id.
257. See Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Fla. 1992) (Harding, J., concurring)("Ex
parte communications with a judge, even when related to such matters as sched-
uling, can often damage the perception of fairness and should be avoided where
at all possible."); Lubet, supra note 102, at 96 (commenting that the problems
with ex parte communications may stem from judges' failures to recognize ex
parte contacts as they occur).
258. No. 89-2243, 1990 WL 47540 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1990).
259. See id. at *1-2.
260. Id. at *1.
261. 601 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Fla. 1992).
262. See id.
263. WnIui A.- BERRY, JUSTICE FOR SALE 117-18 (1996).
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Pretty soon, however, Mr. Doe started talking about the other side, what
dirty so-and-sos they were, and how they were playing all these dirty tricks on
him. I stopped him right there. "Wait just a minute Mr. Doe. You came out
here to discuss procedure, which was great, and I appreciate it. But now
you're getting into the merits of the lawsuit."2 64
The lawyer glared at the Justice and left. 26 5 Justice Berry explains
that later he received a letter from the attorney not apologizing, but
merely suggesting that this was the way business was conducted in
Oklahoma. 2 66 Such events can transpire any time a private conversa-
tion occurs between an attorney with a case pending and the judge
that is hearing the case.
The seminal case in the area of ex parte communication, Haller v.
Robbins,267 began as a conversation on procedure. In Haller, the de-
fendant was charged with several offenses, including kidnapping,
stemming from the burglary and abduction of a young woman. The
defendant pled guilty to one count of kidnapping pursuant to a plea
agreement reached with the prosecution. 268 Sometime2 69 between the
entry of the plea and the sentencing, the prosecutor disclosed to the
judge, in the absence of the defendant or his counsel, the hearsay
statement of the victim containing details of the defendant's sordid
behavior during her abduction.2 70 The Superior Court found that this
information was communicated "in the process of the County Attor-
ney's keeping the court informed of the status of the criminal
docket."2 71 Although it was quite permissible under the rules of pro-
fessional conduct for the prosecutor to meet with the court regarding
the docket, the conversation that occurred regarding the victim's
description of the torture inflicted by the defendant violated the defen-
dant's due process rights.272
Although it is permissible conduct under the rules, these conversa-
tions contribute to the "team spirit" between the judge and the prose-
cutor. Additionally, conversations on procedure and scheduling can
unfairly advantage the prosecutor. Further, these administrative
matters can naturally result in conversations about the merits of the
case. Finally, ex parte communications negatively impact the proper
operation of the adversary system.
264. Id. at 118.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. 409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969).
268. See id. at 858-59.
269. The exact timing of the disclosure remained unresolved. See id. at 859.
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 860.
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C. Impact on the Adversary System
1. Only One Side of the Case is Presented
The basic premise of the system, that each party will present its
side of the case in a partisan manner, is thwarted by ex parte conver-
sations. 27 3 The Supreme Court in Herring v. New York274 recognized
that the very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is
that "partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free."2 75 In an ex parte conversation, the prosecutor is the only advo-
cate present.2 76 The court in Wolfson recognized that "[hiowever im-
partial a prosecutor may mean to be, he is an advocate, accustomed to
stating only one side of the case."2 77 If "truth is best discovered by
powerful statements on both sides of the question,"2 78 then no truth is
likely to emerge from a one-sided conversation, where the defendant's
side of the case is not presented nor is the prosecution's version con-
troverted. 27 9 It is through the interplay of the two participants,
presenting their cases and disputing the other side's version, from
which a fair decision can be reached.28 0 The participation of both par-
ties is the "fundamental instrument of judicial judgment."28 1
This notion of joint participation is reflected in the basic rights of
the criminal defendant found in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.2 82 It reads, in pertinent part, "[iun all criminal
273. See Lubet, supra note 102, at 96 (noting the one-side presentation in ex parte
communications).
274. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
275. Id. at 862.
276. See Hailer v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969).
277. United States v. Wolfson, 634 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1980).
278. Irving R. Kaufinan, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A.B.A.
J. 569, 569 (1975); see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984).
279. See Magness v. Magness, 558 A.2d 807, 810 (Md. 1989); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 360 (1977)(noting the necessity of "debate between adversaries" to ac-
complish the truth-seeking function of the adversary system).
280. See United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 70 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ken-
ney, 911 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1990)(stating that the adversary process is satis-
fied when the defendant is given an opportunity to dispute prosecution's
allegations).
281. In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1188 (2d Cir. 1977)(quoting Carroll v. Princess Anne,
393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)).
282. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1932). In Gideon, the Supreme Court declared:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fun-
damental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards de-
signed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every de-
fendant stands equal before the law.
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prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense." 283 This fundamental right requires
that not only counsel is appointed, but that the accused has "counsel
acting in the role of advocate."284 The defendant receives little benefit
from the right to counsel if counsel is unable to correct inaccurate or
misleading information conveyed to the court in secret.28 5 The rights
afforded the defendant in the Sixth Amendment can be eradicated by
the ex parte relationship that develops between the judge and
prosecutor.
2. Rules Not Enforced or Enforceable
The formality required by the adversary process 28S does not oper-
ate in an ex parte communication. No structured rules control the
conversations between judges and prosecutors. Most of these conver-
sations happen "off the record,"287 many times in chambers, and are
not governed by the rules of procedure or evidence.28 8 Therefore, the
benefits and restraints of these regulations 28 9 are not present when
the judge meets privately with the prosecutor.
3. The Impartiality of the Judge is Impaired
During an ex parte conversation, a judge's impartiality is impaired
in two ways. First, the judge may be influenced by the information
and argument he is hearing from one advocate, to the exclusion of the
opposing view.2 90 The adversary process recognizes that the decision-
maker must remain neutral until all of the information has been pro-
vided to her.2 9i A judge who "prematurely commit[s]" herself to one
version of the facts may fail to appreciate the value of all the evi-
dence.2 92 Additionally, the judge may also become cemented in her
opinion based merely on the fact that she heard one uncontroverted
version first.293 The lack of appreciation for the importance of all the
283. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
284. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967); see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
758 (1983)(Brennan, J., dissenting)(stating that "counsel must function as an ad-
vocate for the defendant, as opposed to a friend of the court")(citations omitted).
285. See United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1119-21 (7th Cir. 1970).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 53-76.
287. "Off the record" refers to the lack of a transcript.
288. Rule 101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines the scope of application for the
rules as being "proceedings in the courts." Rule 1101(d)(3) specifically precludes
the use of the evidence rules in the issuance of arrest and search warrants.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 53-76.
290. See Haler v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 859-60 (1st Cir. 1969).
291. See LANDsuAN, supra note 4, at 2-3.
292. Id. at 3; see Haller, 409 F.2d at 859-60.
293. See Haller, 409 F.2d at 859-60; see also United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971,
1001 n.31 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981)(noting that defendants argued that the
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evidence carries the dual risks of impartiality and erroneous decisions
on the facts or law.294
Secondly, the judge is forced into the position of an advocate.2 9 5
Certain tasks are more properly the functions of an advocate. The
judge, when reviewing ex parte information, may be required to per-
form some of the roles that are more naturally the roles of the advo-
cate. 29 6 Additionally, because the judge is not given all the
information, he is forced to attempt to take on the role of the opposing
view in evaluating the evidence. Ex parte communications between
the judge and prosecutor thwart the proper functioning of the adver-
sary system and therefore must be eliminated.
V. ELIMINATING THE TEAM MENTALITY
Many times the relationship that builds between the prosecutor
and the judge develops over time. The improper conversations that
occur begin in permissible settings and are unintended.2 97 Most
judges and prosecutors do not intend to act improperly by communi-
cating ex parte.298 The communications become just a natural result
of a cooperative and collaborative effort.2 99 As Professor Lubet noted,
trial judge became "conditioned by Government" through ex parte discussions to
believe the "worst about [them].").
294. See United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1987); Magness v.
Magness, 558 A.2d 807, 811 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Lubet, supra note 102, at
96-97.
295. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966); Napue, 834 F.2d at
1319; United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1970).
296. See Dennis, 384 U.S. at 874-75 (reviewing transcripts for inconsistencies is the
role of the advocate).
297. See Caldwell v. State, 445 A.2d 1069, 1072-73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)(reversing
conviction even though ex parte conversation came about innocently and in good
faith).
298. See In re Kaunan, 416 S.E.2d 480, 485 (W. Va. 1992)(finding improper ex parte
communications between a judge and party even though the judge acted "well-
intentioned" in the routine practice of telephoning parties to "speed things
along"). But see In re Tesmer, 580 N.W.2d 307, 317 (Wis. 1998)(issuing a repri-
mand but finding no judicial misconduct when judge conferred in good faith with
a law professor).
299. As one author noted:
The moral fabric of an attorney is stitched out of dozens - hundreds - of
decisions that she makes each day.... It is stitched out of one decision
after another, each of which may be mundane in itself, but all of which
combine to form the moral fabric of the attorney, and combine with like
decisions of other attorneys to form the moral fabric of law firms and
legal communities.
Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law




they may result from "laxity, inattention, or simple ignorance of the
law.3oo
A. Controlling the Relationship
One of the primary causes for a relationship that goes beyond mere
acquaintances is the constant contact and cooperation.3 O' Therefore,
in order to avoid the creation of this "team," supervisors and managers
in prosecution offices should consider carefully before assigning prose-
cutors to work in courtrooms where former colleagues are sitting as
presiding judge. Obviously, this may require the chief judges to also
be aware of the problem in the assignment of judges who have previ-
ously worked for the prosecutor's office. Larger jurisdictions should
assign judges who have come from the prosecutor's offices to a division
that may not require as much contact with prosecutors.
Additionally, prosecutors should be rotated from courtroom to
courtroom to avoid developing an intimate relationship between the
prosecutor and the court. The time that a prosecutor remains in one
division should be limited. This may require reassignment of cases.
However, the benefit to the adversary system and appearances of fair-
ness outweighs the administrative problems that may arise.
Prosecutors must avoid unnecessary ex parte conferences with
judges. The prosecutor's office must have a policy that discourages ex
parte communications.3 02 The policy should disapprove of not only
unethical conversations on the merits but also ex parte discussions on
procedure, scheduling and administrative matters. The prosecutor
should encourage the court to hold all dialogues regarding these mat-
ters either in the physical presence of the opposing counsel or by tele-
phone. Issues of administration of the docket and procedure can be
discussed with both the prosecutor and a representative from the pub-
lic defender's office.
Prosecutors must be educated about the relationship between the
court and prosecutors.0 3 The prosecutor's office and judges must rec-
ognize the costs to the system caused by intimate relationships be-
tween them. The prosecutor's office must educate the prosecutors
about the unfair tactical advantages that they receive based on the
relationship. The attorneys must not seek to curry favor and seek un-
300. Lubet, supra note 102, at 97.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 138-144.
302. See National Prosecution Standard 6.3, created by the National District Attor-
neys Association, suggests that a prosecutor's office should create and maintain a
code of professionalism. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 63 (2d ed. 1991).
303. See ROBERTA K. FLOWERS, PROFESSIONALISM AND THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTOR
(1997)(available from the author).
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fair advantage from these relationships.304 They must also be con-
vinced that such actions are improper and unprofessional. They
should not perceive the creation of close relationships with the court
as part of their zealous representation of the state. Training must in-
clude role modeling by the chief prosecutors and elected prosecutors
showing the proper relationship between the court and prosecutor.30 5
B. All Communications Between the Judge and Prosecutor
Should Occur in the Courtroom
All conversations held in the court's private chambers have the po-
tential to lead to improper conduct and create a sense of informality
and familiarity that contribute to the "team" mentality. Therefore, all
contact between a prosecutor and a judge should occur in the court-
room. Conversations that routinely occur in chambers, including
scheduling and requests for warrants, can easily occur in the court-
room. If the judge and prosecutor avoid meeting in chambers,
problems can be avoided.306
First of all, conversations that occur in the courtroom have a more
formal and public atmosphere. Even though the judge and prosecutor
may be alone, the sense that they are restrained by the formality of
the courtroom may deter improper conversation and cooperation. Ad-
ditionally, because the conversations take place in a courtroom, the
proper respective roles of judge and advocate are perpetuated. Thejudge remains on the bench and the advocate/prosecutor addresses the
court from the well of the courtroom. The physical distance assists in
maintaining the separation of roles and viewpoints.
Conversations are more likely to be placed on the record if they
transpire in the courtroom. The location of the conversation lends it-
self to the communications being recorded. All conversations that oc-
cur between the judge and prosecutor should be recorded. The
recording of all conversations, including those permissible ex parteO 7
304. See National Prosecution Standard 23.3 mandates that "[clounsel should not seek
to unfairly influence the proper course ofjustice by any relationship, commiunica-
tion, or pressure upon the court." NAT'L PROSECUTION STNDARD § 23.3 (2d ed.
1991).
305. See generally Schiltz, supra note 299 (discussing the importance of mentoring in
the professional life of the new lawyer). But see GERsHmAN, supra note 116, at§ 12:15 (suggesting that a court can speak to a supervising prosecutor about ob-
jectionable behavior of a staff prosecutor).
306. See Egelak v. Alaska, 438 P.2d 712, 715 (Alaska 1968)(noting that the prosecutor
should have shown the court proposed picture exhibits in open court in presence
of opposing counsel).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 206-265. I include in this category the pres-
entation to the judge of search and arrest warrants. Although no evidence is
being elicited, by taking the applications on the record there is no question about




conversations, allows for meaningful review of the conversation. Sev-
eral courts have commented on the need to have ex parte conversa-
tions recorded.308 In United States v. Watchmaker, the Eleventh
Circuit approved an ex parte conversation with a frightened juror be-
cause the entire conversation was transcribed. 30 9
Finally, people tend to be more circumspect when they know that
their words will be recorded and possibly reviewed. A judge and pros-
ecutor, who know that their words are being recorded, are less likely
to improperly speak on the merits or even appear to be collaborating.
The judge in Martinez3 1 0 would have been less willing to suggest that
he was planning to goad the defense attorney into asking for a mis-
trial had he known that his words were being recorded.3 1 i The pres-
ence of a recording device would cause judges and prosecutors to
maintain the correct posture of distinct participants in the adversary
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The old saying "familiarity breeds contempt"3 1 2 seems not to hold
true in the case of the relationship between the prosecutor and the
judge. The constant contact, both in the courtroom and in permissible
ex parte communications, causes a "team spirit" to develop that has a
negative impact on the proper functioning of the adversary system. A
conscious effort by the judge and prosecutor to resist collaboration is
necessary to prevent the adversary system from being thwarted. The
system cannot function when the defendant's principal adversary has
"private access to the ear of the court."313 As Justice Berry put it:
"The concept of equal justice is meaningless if some parties benefit
from a relationship with a judge, while others do not."3 1 4
308. See United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Adams, 785 F.2d 917, 920 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Watchmaker, 761
F.2d 1459, 1466 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 858 (2d
Cir. 1983)(noting that a verbatim transcript of the ex parte conversation was
made); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1000 n.31 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec.
1981)(noting that prosecutors obtained another judge's permission before ap-
proaching the trial judge ex parte about the defendant's plans to disrupt the
trial); United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
309. See Watchmaker, 761 F.2d at 1466.
310. 667 F.2d 886 (10th Cir. 1981). For a full description of the case, see supra text
accompanying notes 123-131.
311. See Martinez, 667 F.2d 886.
312. Aesop, The Fox and the Lion, in FOLKLORE AND FAiEn (1937). Mark Twain later
modified the saying to "familiarity breeds contempt and children." MARK TwAIN,
MARK TwAq's NoTBooxs 37 (1935).
313. Haller v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969).
314. BERRY, supra note 263, at 113.
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